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The relative frame of reference (FoR) is used to describe spatial relations between two objects 
from an observer’s perspective. Standard, frontal referencing situations with objects located 
in the observer’s visual field afford three well-established variants: translation, reflection, and 
rotation. Here, we focus on references in non-standard situations with objects located at the 
back or at the side of an observer (dorsal and lateral, respectively). We scrutinise the 
consistency assumption, which was introduced to infer the covert strategy used in dorsal tasks 
from an ambiguous overt response: that, when confronted with a non-standard situation, 
people adopt a strategy consistent with how they construct the relative FoR in frontal 
situations. Lateral tasks enable us to disentangle the ambiguous response. The results of a 
study in Norway and Germany support the consistency assumption in part: Nearly all 
participants with a preference for translation in frontal tasks applied translation in lateral 
tasks, and some participants with a preference for reflection in frontal tasks turned towards the 
objects before applying reflection in lateral tasks. Most other participants with a preference 
for reflection in frontal tasks, however, switched to translation in lateral tasks. The latter may 
be due to a specific affordance of the lateral arrangements, which invite translation as the 
easier strategy compared to the alternative derived from reflection. Our findings indicate that 
people do not apply their preferred variant of the relative FoR to all kinds of situations, but 
rather flexibly adapt their strategy when it is more convenient to do so. 
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Questions about the spatial location of objects are frequent accompaniments to daily life. 
You may ask, for example, the shop assistant where to find the beans, “on the rack in front of 
me or on the one behind me?” Or, when helping to tidy your child’s room: “Where should the 
ball go, on the shelf to my left or to my right?” Answers to such questions require the 
application of a frame of reference (FoR) that specifies the orientation of the relevant 
dimensions, here: front-back and left-right. The most basic FoR providing a coordinate system 
suitable to localize the objects in the examples above is the direct FoR (Danziger, 2010; see 
Figure 1A[i]). It is anchored in one’s body and builds on its front-back and left-right axes. As 
such, the FoR provides spatial orientation to the dimensional prepositions “in front of”, 
“behind”, “to the left of”, and “to the right of”, which is necessary to comprehend the above 
questions and to come up with a reasonable answer: “The beans are on the rack behind you” 
and “The ball goes on the shelf to your left”. Technically speaking, adopting the direct FoR 
results in a binary relation between the figure object F (here: rack or shelf) and the ground 
entity G (here: you). 
---------------------------------- Insert Figure 1 about here ---------------------------------- 
In ternary relations, the figure F is not to be localized directly in reference to oneself (the 
referencing person), but in reference to another entity, which then serves as the ground entity 
G (Figure 1B). When having turned to the rack previously at your back, you may start 
wondering: “Are the beans to the left or to the right of the peas?” Or, when placing the ball on 
the shelf: “Should it go in front of or behind the box?” To establish such a ternary FoR, the 
(direct) FoR is transferred onto the intended reference point G (here: the peas or the box), 
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which then allows one to refer F to G from the viewpoint of the observer O: “The beans are to 
the right of the peas” and “The ball should go behind the box”. In Levinson’s (2003) 
nomenclature, the direct FoR is a specific instance of the intrinsic FoR (Figure 1A[ii]), 
whereas each FoR including an observer O distinct from G is a relative FoR because the 
description of the spatial relation changes with O’s viewpoint relative to the objects F and G 
(when you place the ball “behind the box” from your point of view, it may be “to the left of 
the box” from your child’s point of view, if your child is looking at it from a different angle). 
In this paper, we focus on how flexible people are in using the relative FoR in different kinds 
of spatial settings. Specifically, we aim to assess whether they transfer preferences for a 
specific variant of referencing from standard to non-standard situations. This is of interest not 
only in its own right, but critical for theoretical claims according to which reference strategies 
are adopted in a consistent manner across domains and spill over, for instance, into spatial 
representations of time (Boroditsky, 2000; Clark, 1973) or number (Dehaene, Bossini, & 
Giraux, 1993; Fias & Fischer, 2005). 
Previous research on spatial FoRs has indicated variation in the use of the relative FoR 
along several lines. First, there is variation across languages and cultures with regard to 
whether a relative FoR is adopted at all and, if so, whether it is preferred over the other two 
basic FoRs: the absolute FoR derived from a superordinate field like the cardinal directions, 
and the intrinsic FoR derived from an intrinsically oriented ground object like a person or a 
car (Bohnemeyer & O’Meara, 2012; Levinson, 2003; Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & 
Levinson, 2004; Senft, 1997). For example, speakers of several Australian languages lacking 
dimensional prepositions for the intrinsic and relative FoR make exclusive use of the absolute 
FoR (Levinson, 2003; Majid et al., 2004). By contrast, speakers of European languages prefer 
the relative or intrinsic FoR over the absolute FoR, specifically in small-scale settings (Majid 
et al., 2004; Mishra, Sing, & Dasen, 2009). Similarly, the degree to which people adopt the 
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intrinsic FoR compared to the relative FoR varies cross-linguistically (Beller & Bender, 2017; 
Beller, Singmann, Hüther, & Bender, 2015; Majid et al., 2004) and depends on experiential 
and contextual factors (Bohnemeyer, 2011; Carlson-Radvansky & Radvansky, 1996; Carroll, 
1997; Grabowski & Miller, 2000; Hill, 1978; Hüther, Müller, & Spada, 2016; Levelt, 1984; 
Surtees, Noordzij, & Apperly, 2012). 
Second, how the relative FoR is constructed also varies. For standard referencing 
situations in which figure and ground are located in the visual field of an observer, Levinson 
(2003) suggested three variants of the relative FoR that emerge from different construction 
principles: translation, reflection, and rotation. In the case of translation, the FoR originally 
anchored in the observer O is simply shifted into the ground object G without changing the 
orientation of the axes, so that FRONT of the derived FoR is aligned with O’s looking direction. 
Hence, the area beyond G is defined as FRONT, and LEFT and RIGHT correspond to O’s LEFT 
and RIGHT (Figure 1B[i]). In the case of reflection, the FoR originally anchored in O is 
mirrored in G. As in a mirror image, FRONT and BACK of the derived FoR are swapped (but 
not its LEFT and RIGHT), with FRONT now pointing towards O. Hence, the area between O and 
G is defined as FRONT, while LEFT and RIGHT still correspond to O’s LEFT and RIGHT (Figure 
1B[ii]). In the case of rotation, finally, the FoR originally anchored in O is rotated in G, so 
that FRONT of the derived FoR is again pointing towards O. Therefore, the area between O and 
G is defined as FRONT, while LEFT and RIGHT are swapped compared to O’s LEFT and RIGHT 
(Figure 1B[iii]). A survey across seven languages revealed diverging preferences for 
translation or reflection, whereas rotation occurs only rarely (Beller et al. 2015; Beller & 
Bender, 2017) The proportion of reflection was highest among German participants (88%) 
and lowest among Tongan participants (8%), and reversed for translation (6% vs. 58%). These 
results indicate cross-cultural variation in the use of the different variants of the relative FoR, 
but also inter-individual differences within each sample.  
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A third line of variation in the use of the relative FoR emerges when we turn from 
standard referencing situations with F and G being in the observer’s visual field (i.e., frontal 
settings) to a non-standard, dorsal setting in which F and G are located behind the observer 
(Beller et al., 2015). Here, what varies is whether people directly apply a variant of the relative 
FoR (presumably the one they prefer in standard, frontal situations), or whether they mentally 
turn the observer (i.e., the depicted person or themselves) towards the setting—thereby 
converting the non-standard, dorsal situation into a standard, frontal situation—before 
applying a FoR (turn-strategy; Grabowski, 1999; Grabowski & Miller, 2000, footnote 5; 
Grabowski & Weiß, 1996; and see Beller et al., 2015). Irrespective of the method used to 
provide the participants with access to spatial information in the observer’s back, only few 
participants chose to mentally turn before referencing (Beller & Bender, 2017; Beller, Bohlen, 
Hüther, & Bender, 2016; Beller et al., 2015; Fischer, 2016). Most participants either applied 
the translation strategy directly, that is, without a previous mental turn, by shifting the FoR 
backward into G (as illustrated in Figure 2A), or they generalized the reflection strategy to a 
kind of inward-directed FoR. In doing so, they considered the area between O and G as “in 
front of” G and the area beyond G as “behind” G, while “left” and “right” corresponded to O’s 
LEFT and RIGHT (Figure 2B). 
---------------------------------- Insert Figure 2 about here ---------------------------------- 
The three types of variability described here differ in what they reveal about theoretical 
assumptions on FoR selection. While variability in usage of basic FoRs (absolute, intrinsic, or 
relative) mainly arises from different options to anchor the coordinate system (i.e., in a 
superordinate field, the ground object, or the observer), and hence is a matter of perspective-
taking, variability in usage of relative FoR variants (translation, reflection, or rotation) arises 
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from different options to transfer the direct FoR from the observer to another ground object, 
and hence is a matter of construction. Which perspective one takes partly depends on cultural 
and linguistic conventions, but also on demand characteristics of task and situation (e.g., if the 
ground object lacks orientation, the intrinsic FoR cannot be applied). When it comes to the 
relative variants, factors influencing the selection are basically unknown. Even the question of 
whether people do select one anew every time need arises, rather than following stable habits 
has not been asked, let alone answered. Given the cognitive effort involved in constructing a 
ternary FoR, it seems plausible to assume that people follow existing preferences for a 
specific variant (consistency assumption), but this assumption has not been tested empirically. 
Non-standard referencing situations have the potential to scrutinize whether the assumption 
holds. Similar FoR patterns across standard and non-standard situations would support the 
consistency assumption and speak for habitualized referencing, whereas variability in FoR 
patterns would suggest that people construct FoRs depending on situational characteristics.  
To distinguish between the two options, being able to disentangle direct translation 
(Figure 2A) and inward-directed reflection (Figure 2B) is essential. For logical reasons, 
however, these two covert strategies generate the same overt response in dorsal tasks
1
. In our 
previous papers, which basically aimed at exploring people’s referencing strategies in dorsal 
settings, we therefore used the consistency assumption to disambiguate responses. 
Specifically, we reasoned that participants adopt a strategy in dorsal settings that is at least 
consistent with, if not derived from, how they construct the relative FoR in frontal settings, 
and infered that those with a frontal preference for translation adopted backward translation, 
and those with a frontal preference for reflection adopted inward-directed reflection (Beller et 
                                                          
1
 Actually, a third strategy also generates the same response: turn-rotation (i.e., first turn O towards the objects 
and then apply rotation). However, this strategy is not very likely for two reasons: First, the rotation variant of the 
relative FoR is very rare even in standard, frontal situations (Beller et al., 2015; Beller & Bender, 2017), and 




al., 2016; Beller & Bender, 2017). Yet, even though the consistency assumption is plausible 
from a theoretical point of view, it remains inconclusive without independent tests of its 
validity. 
In the present paper, we therefore attempt to directly assess the consistency assumption by 
including a non-standard referencing situation for which translation and inward-directed 
reflection do produce different overt responses: lateral settings, that is, settings in which the 
objects are located at one side of the observer O. While the translation strategy can be applied 
to a lateral setting in exactly the same way as to a frontal and dorsal setting—by shifting the 
FoR originally anchored in O sideward into G (Figure 2C)—the construction of the inward-
directed FoR is similar only for frontal and dorsal settings. Specifically, considering the area 
between O and G as “in front of” G allows one to take LEFT and RIGHT from O’s LEFT and 
RIGHT in frontal and dorsal settings only. By contrast, in the lateral setting, LEFT and RIGHT 
have to be assigned according to the newly constructed FRONT, which necessitates a rotation of 
the left-right dimension (Figure 2D).  
In a nutshell, the main goal of this paper is to investigate whether people’s spatial 
references generalize from standard to non-standard situations in line with the consistency 
assumption. If this assumption holds, people who prefer translation in frontal settings should 
also adopt translation in dorsal and lateral settings, and people who prefer reflection in frontal 
settings should also adopt (inward-directed) reflection in dorsal and lateral settings. 
Importantly, the front-back axis of the derived FoR is aligned to O’s front-back axis in dorsal, 
but not lateral situations, which will allow us to disentangle translation and inward-directed 
reflection in lateral situations. Furthermore, while consistency is easy to preserve for 
translation regardless of where the objects are located, consistency is more difficult to 
preserve for reflection because it requires a rotation of the left-right axis that is not necessary 




In the following experiment, we investigated different strategies of applying a relative FoR 
to non-standard, dorsal and lateral settings as compared to the standard, frontal setting. The 
main question we seek to answer is whether participants follow the consistency assumption by 
using a FoR variant in non-standard settings that is consistent with the variant preferred in the 
standard setting. Particularly interesting in this regard are participants with a frontal 
preference for reflection, as consistency is more difficult for them to preserve compared to 
participants with a preference for translation. We therefore focus on speakers of German and 
Norwegian, who, according to a previous survey (Beller & Bender, 2017), are those with the 
highest proportion of the reflection variant in frontal settings (88% and 72%, respectively). 
The proportion of speakers adopting translation (6% and 22%, respectively) would serve as a 
reference for comparison. If the consistency assumption is true, all users of frontal translation 
should adopt translation also in lateral settings, and all users of frontal reflection should adopt 
inward-directed reflection in lateral settings. If speakers deviate from this pattern, the 
consistency assumption would have to be qualified or discarded. As items, we used drawings 
of small-scale, static situations with two objects, F and G, and an observer O whose 
perspective had to be taken. To check whether participants do take the observer’s perspective, 
we implemented all items with two perspectives. To scrutinize the extent to which 
participants’ referencing behaviour follows the consistency assumption, we presented frontal, 
dorsal, and lateral items within-subject. 
Method 
Materials. A total of 28 items were used. Each item depicted a spatial configuration with 
three entities—a black square (G), a white circle (F), and an observer (O)—from a bird’s eye 
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view. The items varied with respect to two aspects: the gaze direction of O in relation to the 
direction of the participant’s gaze, and the location of F and G in relation to O. For half of the 
items, O’s gaze direction was identical with the participant’s gaze direction (aligned-gaze 
condition); for the other half, it was rotated 90° counterclockwise (rotated-gaze condition). 
For each of the two gaze conditions, we constructed four items with F and G being in O’s 
visual field (frontal item set), four items with F and G being behind O (dorsal item set), and 
six items with at least one object being at one side of O (lateral item set), amounting to six 
item sets overall; see Figure 3 for a selection of example items, and Appendix A for the 
complete sets of items. Each item required participants to describe (from the perspective of 
the depicted observer) how F is related to G by marking one of eight response options: 
The white circle is located … 
 □ in front of □ in front and to the left of 
 □ behind □ in front and to the right of 
 □ to the left of □ behind and to the left of 
 □ to the right of □ behind and to the right of 
… the black square. 
All materials were prepared in Norwegian and German by the bilingual authors and were 
cross-checked by native speakers. 
---------------------------------- Insert Figure 3 about here ---------------------------------- 
Design and procedure. The Norwegian part of the study was carried out at the University 
of Bergen (Norway) and the German part at the University of Freiburg (Germany). 
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Participants worked on the task individually. Written informed consent was obtained, and 
demographic characteristics were collected.  
The study was implemented as a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. The six item sets were 
presented within-subjects in two blocks. To control for possible order effects, half of the 
participants started with the three item sets of the aligned-gaze condition in the first block 
followed by the three item sets of the rotated-gaze condition in the second block. For the other 
half of participants, block assignment was reversed. Within each block, six orders of items 
were implemented. The items of each set (frontal, dorsal, and lateral) were presented in a row, 
implementing three orders: (i) frontal items first, then lateral and dorsal ones; (ii) dorsal items 
first, then frontal and lateral ones; (iii) lateral items first, then dorsal and frontal ones. For 
each set, the individual items were arranged in a “standard” sequence (from 1 to N, as 
indicated in Appendix A) or in the reversed sequence (from N to 1). Participants were 
assigned randomly to, but distributed equally across, the two orders of blocks and, within each 
block, to one of the six orders of items. They were instructed to work on all items in the given 
order. The time needed to complete each of the two blocks was measured (in minutes and 
seconds). 
Finally, participants were asked which strategies they had used to adopt the perspective of 
the depicted observer (when it differed from their own), and whether they regarded certain 
types of items as more difficult than others. The strategy question used a task from the rotated-
gaze condition as example and provided four response options as multiple choice: (a) turning 
the questionnaire physically or (b) mentally, or (c) turning oneself physically or (d) mentally. 
An open response option was provided for describing any other strategy participants may have 
used instead or as well. Three questions assessed subjective item difficulties. Each repeated 
two example tasks (A and B) and provided three options: (a) task A was more difficult than 
task B, (b) task B was more difficult than task A, or (c) tasks A and B were equally difficult. 
12 
 
The first question required participants to compare an item with rotated gaze (A) to an item 
with aligned gaze (B); the second to compare a frontal item (A) to a dorsal item (B); and the 
third to compare a frontal item (A) to a lateral item (B). 
Participants. The Norwegian sample consisted of 42 native speakers of Norwegian (24 
female, 18 male; age: M = 22.0 years, SD = 2.1, range 19-28 years). Most of them were 
students from the University of Bergen studying different subjects; some were non-students. 
The German sample consisted of 42 native speakers of German (34 female, 7 male, one 
participant did not indicate his/her gender; age: M = 22.6 years, SD = 4.4, range 19-42 years). 
Most of them were students from the University of Freiburg studying different subjects; some 
were non-students. Participation was voluntary. Participants were compensated with a voucher 
worth 65 Norwegian kroner (in Norway) or with 5 EURO (in Germany). 
Results 
On average, participants took 6:17 minutes to complete the two blocks of referencing 
items from the main part of the study. An analysis of variance with two within-subject factors 
block (first vs. second) and gaze condition (aligned vs. rotated), and one between-subjects 
factor country (Norway vs. Germany) indicated two main effects: block and country. 
Generally, participants needed significantly more time to complete the first block of items 
(230.9 s) than to complete the second block (146.0 s); F(1,80) = 163.268, p < .001, η2 = .671; 
which is consistent with an increasing familiarization with the task. In addition, there was a 
small difference between countries: The Norwegian participants needed slightly longer to 
complete a block (201.5 s on average per block) than did the German participants (175.4 s); 
F(1,80) = 4.069, p = .047, η2 = .048. Interestingly, gaze condition (aligned vs. rotated) did not 




Coding of FoRs. All FoRs were determined from the point of view of the depicted 
observer. For frontal items, we distinguished between Levinson’s (2003) three variants of the 
relative FoR: translation, reflection, and rotation (see Figure 1B). For the dorsal items, we 
distinguished—according to the “turn-strategy” (Grabowski & Miller, 2000) and in line with 
previous studies (e.g. Beller et al., 2015, 2016)—between turn-translation, turn-reflection, and 
turn-rotation. As explained in the introduction, turn-rotation is logically equivalent to 
translation and to inward-directed reflection (cf. Beller et al., 2015, Figure 7; and see footnote 
1). Therefore, the corresponding response option also covers responses from participants 
adopting one of these two FoRs. In the lateral case, turn-rotation is logically equivalent to 
inward-directed reflection, but not to translation, and our lateral items were designed such that 
translation would produce a response distinct from the three turn-variants. This allowed us to 
distinguish between translation, turn-translation, turn-reflection, and turn-rotation (also 
covering responses from participants adopting inward-directed reflection). Finally, responses 
that were not covered by any of these FoRs were classified as “unexplained” responses. 
The referencing data were analyzed in three steps. First, we inspected the extent to which 
participants’ responses could not be explained by the FoRs under scrutiny in the different item 
sets (frontal, dorsal, and lateral); then, we looked at how consistently participants responded in 
terms of FoRs within each set; and finally, we determined which FoR (if any) each participant 
preferred in each set. 
(1) Unexplained responses. First, we checked the different item sets for differences in the 
mean number of responses that were not covered by any of the FoRs under scrutiny. Across 
the two countries and all items, this number of “unexplained” responses was fairly low (M = 
9.0%; see Table 1). An analysis of variance of the proportion of unexplained responses with 
two within-subject factors item set (frontal vs. dorsal vs. lateral) and gaze condition (aligned 
vs. rotated), and three between-subjects factors country (Norway vs. Germany), order of item 
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sets in Block 1 (frontal first vs. dorsal first vs. lateral first) and order of item sets in Block 2 
(frontal first vs. dorsal first vs. lateral first), indicated only one significant effect: a main effect 
of order of item sets in Block 1; F(2,66) = 4.379; p = .016; η2 = .117; for all other effects: p > 
.166; η
2
 < .075. The proportion of unexplained responses was significantly higher when 
participants had started the questionnaire with a frontal item set (M = 17.1%; N = 31; p < 
.010; Bonferroni-corrected) than when they had started with a dorsal item set (M = 5.6%; N = 
26) or a lateral item set (M = 3.0%; N = 27). Importantly, the analysis indicated no significant 
differences between the three item sets (frontal: 6.8%; dorsal: 9.5%; lateral: 10.6%; 
F(1.76,116.40 [Greenhouse-Geisser-corrected degrees of freedom]) = 1.234; p = .292; η2 = 
.018), no significant differences between the two gaze conditions (aligned: 9.0%; rotated: 
9.0%; F(1,66) < 1), and no significant differences between the two countries (Norway: 8.1%; 
Germany: 9.9%; F(1,66) < 1), suggesting that neither the non-standard, dorsal and lateral 
referencing situations, nor the mental rotation involved in the rotated-gaze condition, 
influenced the coverage of responses by the FoRs under scrutiny in the two countries alike. 
 
 
Table 1. Frequency (in %; N = 42) of responses that were not covered by any of the FoRs 
under scrutiny. 
 Item set 
 Frontal  Dorsal  Lateral 
 Country  Country  Country 
Gaze condition Norway Germany  Norway Germany  Norway Germany 
Aligned 4.8 5.4  7.1 13.1  10.7 13.1 
Rotated by 90° 8.9 8.3  7.1 10.7    9.9   8.7 
 
(2) Individual consistency within sets. Next, we determined whether an individual 
participant adopted one FoR consistently and, if so, which one. To this end, we counted for 
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each participant how often each FoR could be coded in each of the six item sets (frontal 
aligned/rotated, dorsal aligned/rotated, and lateral aligned/rotated). For example, if reflection 
could be coded on three items and translation on one item, consistency would be 75% for 
reflection and 25% for translation. We then used the maximum of these values as an estimate 
of a participant’s consistency in FoR adoption across the items of the respective set (75% in 
the example). Mean consistency values are displayed in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Individual consistency in FoR adoption (in % of items). 
 Item set 
 Frontal (4 items)  Dorsal (4 items)  Lateral (6 items) 
 Country  Country  Country 
Gaze condition Norway Germany  Norway Germany  Norway Germany 
Aligned 91.7 91.1  89.9 85.7  84.9 75.8 
Rotated by 90° 88.1 87.5  88.7 86.9  81.7 80.2 
 
Across the two countries and all items, FoRs were adopted with a mean consistency of 
86.0%. An analysis of variance of the consistency values with the same within-subject and 
between-subjects factors as before indicated two significant effects: a main effect of item set; 
F(2,132) = 4.110; p = .019; η2 = .059; and a main effect of order of item sets in Block 1; 
F(2,66) = 4.738; p = .012; η2 = .126; for all other effects: p > .122; η2 < .102. Consistency 
values were higher for the frontal item sets (M = 89.6%) and the dorsal item sets (M = 87.8%) 
than for the lateral item sets (M = 80.7%). And, complementary to the number of unexplained 
responses, consistency values were significantly lower across all items when participants had 
started the questionnaire with a frontal item set (M = 77.3%; N = 31; p < .003; Bonferroni-
corrected) than when they had started with a dorsal item set (M = 90.4%; N = 26) or a lateral 
item set (M = 91.8%; N = 27). Again, the analysis indicated no significant differences between 
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the two gaze conditions (aligned: 86.5%; rotated: 85.5%; F(1,66) < 1), and no significant 
differences between the two countries (Norway: 87.5%; Germany: 84.5%; F(1,66) < 1), 
suggesting that the mental rotation involved in the rotated-gaze condition did not influence the 
consistency of responses in terms of FoRs adoption in the two countries alike. 
(3) FoR preference. Finally, we identified each participant’s preferred FoR as the one that 
was coded (a) more often than all others and (b) in at least three out of the four items of each 
frontal and dorsal set, or in at least four out of the six items of each lateral set, respectively 
(i.e., with a consistency of ≥ 66.7%). Participants’ preferred FoRs are presented in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3. Preferred FoR (in %; N = 42). 
 Country 
 Norway  Germany 
 Gaze condition  Gaze condition 
FoR Aligned Rotated by 90°  Aligned Rotated by 90° 
(A) Frontal items: FoR adopted in at least 3 out of the 4 items 
Translation 66.7 64.3  28.6 35.7 
Reflection 21.4 21.4  57.1 47.6 
Rotation   0.0   2.4    2.4   4.8 
No preference 11.9 11.9  11.9 11.9 
(B) Dorsal items: FoR adopted in at least 3 out of the 4 items 
Turn-translation   0.0   2.4    2.4   2.4 
Turn-reflection   4.8   9.5    7.1   9.5 
Turn-rotation/ 
translation/inward 
85.7 76.2  73.8 71.4 
No preference 9.5 11.9  16.7 16.7 
(C) Lateral items: FoR adopted in at least 4 out of the 6 items 
Translation 78.6 73.8  57.1 69.0 
Turn-translation   0.0   2.4    2.4   0.0 
Turn-reflection   7.1   7.1  16.7 11.9 
Turn-rotation/inward   0.0   2.4    4.8   2.4 
No preference 14.3 14.3  19.0 16.7 




Statistical analyses. Due to different variants and numbers of FoRs (cf. the section on FoR 
coding), the frontal, dorsal, and lateral data were analyzed separately. In each case, we 
performed a log-linear analysis (Kennedy, 1992) on the distribution of participants’ FoR 
preferences, in which we included three factors: the two main factors of interest, country 
(Norway vs. Germany) and gaze condition (aligned vs. rotated), and the control factor order of 
item sets in Block 1 (frontal first vs. dorsal first vs. lateral first) that proved to be significant in 
the analyses of unexplained responses and consistency values. As gaze condition is considered 
as a between-subjects factor in this analysis, the total N equals twice the total number of 
participants (i.e., N2 = 2 × 84 = 168). The analyses were performed in two steps: model 
selection and model comparisons. Model selection generally aims at identifying the 
combination of factors that is sufficient to explain the data without losing the fit between 
model and data. Fit values were determined according to the G
2
 statistics (criterion: p ≥ .100). 
We started model selection with the model that includes all factors and their interactions and 
explains the data with a perfect fit (G
2
 = 0; df = 0; p = 1). More parsimonious models were 
then selected in a systematic, hypothesis-driven manner, which is described in detail in 
Appendix B. After model selection, we performed model comparisons with the aim of 
determining main effects and interactions as in an analysis of variance. Model comparisons 
are performed by comparing two models that differ in a particular candidate factor and thus 
allow one to test whether the candidate factor makes a significant difference (in our case: 
according to the G
2
 statistics, criterion: p < .050). Finally, particular hypotheses such as the 
hypothesis on perspective taking were substantiated in follow-up analyses. 
(3A) Frontal item sets. According to previous data from Norway and Germany (Beller & 
Bender, 2017), we expected a general preference for reflection. However, this overall 
preference should be more pronounced among German participants than among Norwegian 
participants, leading to a main effect of country. In addition, if participants adopted different 
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strategies for generating a FoR in standard versus non-standard settings, an effect of the 
control variable order of item sets in Block 1 might emerge, which would indicate that FoR 
preferences depended on whether participants started with a frontal, dorsal, or lateral item set. 
Finally, assuming that participants do not change their FoR preference when adopting the 
perspective of the depicted observer (aligned vs. rotated), we did not expect a difference in 
FoR preference between the two gaze conditions. Model selection indeed revealed the model 
with the two main effects of country and order of item sets in Block 1 as the most 
parsimonious model showing sufficient fit (G
2
 = 14.802; df = 24; p = .926). Model 
comparisons indicated the expected main effect of country (G2 = 22.493; df = 3; p < .001) and 
a significant main effect of order of item sets (G2 = 31.116; df = 6; p < .001), but no 
interaction of these two factors (G
2
 = 8.866; df = 6; p = .181). As hypothesized, the factor 
gaze condition together with all of its interactions did not prove to have any significance for 
explaining the data (summed effect: G
2
 = 5.936; df = 18; p = .996). 
Overall, translation and reflection prevailed across the two frontal item sets, covering 
85.7% of the preferences (N2 = 168), whereas rotation was only rarely adopted consistently 
(2.4%; see Table 3 [A]). However, in the Norwegian sample, the majority of participants 
preferred translation (65.5% on average across the two gaze conditions; N2 = 84) and only a 
smaller proportion preferred reflection (21.4%). In the German sample, the pattern was 
reversed: The majority of participants preferred reflection (52.4%; N2 = 84) and a smaller 
proportion preferred translation (32.1%). Across countries, starting with a frontal item set 
resulted in a lower proportion of participants with a preference for translation and a higher 
proportion with no clear preference (trans: 30.6%; ref: 37.1%; no pref: 25.8%; N2 = 62) as 
compared to starting with a dorsal item set (trans: 59.6%; ref: 36.5%; no pref: 3.8%; N2 = 52) 
or a lateral item set (trans: 59.3%; ref: 37.0%; no pref: 3.7%; N2 = 54). The proportion of 
participants adopting reflection was almost unaffected by item order. 
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The log-linear analysis did not indicate differences between the two frontal gaze 
conditions, suggesting that the FoR each participant preferred was independent of the 
perspective to be taken. While this analysis is based on group data only, the within-subject 
design allowed us to check this on an individual basis. To this end, we cross-tabulated 
participants’ preferred FoR in the aligned-gaze condition and the rotated-gaze condition, 
summed over the two countries. Of the 84 participants, 65 (77.4%) exhibited the same 
preference in the two gaze conditions: 37 participants (44.0%) preferred translation, 27 
(32.1%) reflection, and one (1.2%) rotation. Six participants (7.1%) changed their preferred 
FoR from one gaze condition to the other, while the remaining 13 participants (15.5%) 
exhibited no preference for any of the three FoRs under scrutiny in at least one of the two gaze 
conditions. A non-significant marginal homogeneity test for paired tasks supported the 
assumption that the preference distributions of the two gaze conditions were nearly identical; 
std. MH statistic < .001, p > 0.999. We thus have no reason to assume that participants 
preferred different FoRs in the two gaze conditions. 
For coding of the FoRs, we assumed that participants adopted O’s point of view, as 
required by the instruction, and determined the FoRs from this perspective. However, for the 
frontal aligned-gaze condition, there is a second, confounded possibility: that participants 
simply relied on their own perspective on the situation, which is identical to O’s perspective, 
and thus produced the same responses. For the frontal rotated-gaze condition, adopting one’s 
own perspective instead of O’s perspective should result in different responses. Having coded 
FoRs according to O’s perspective, the above finding that most participants preferred the same 
FoR in the aligned-gaze condition as in the rotated-gaze condition is therefore a clear 
indication of perspective taking. As a cross-check, we may look at the match in participants’ 
FoR preferences between the two gaze conditions, this time coding the FoRs according to the 
perspective of the participants (direct FoR). If participants do take O’s perspective, this 
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comparison should result in a mismatch between the two gaze conditions. This is exactly what 
we found when cross-tabulating participants’ preferred FoRs in the aligned-gaze condition (in 
which the participant’s and O’s perspective are identical) and those in the rotated-gaze 
condition (with FoRs now determined from the participant’s perspective): Of the 84 
participants, only one (1.2%) would then exhibit the same preference in the two gaze 
conditions; 81 (96.4%) would exhibit no preference for any of the three FoRs under scrutiny 
in at least one of the two gaze conditions; and two (2.4%) would change their preferred FoR 
from one gaze condition to the other. A new marginal homogeneity test indicated that the 
preference distributions of the two gaze conditions differed; std. MH statistic = 7.752, p < 
.001. This cross-check suggests that participants did not take their own perspective in the 
rotated-gaze condition, but adopted the observer’s point of view, as required by the 
instruction. 
This conclusion is in line with the result from the strategy question, which asked 
participants post-hoc to indicate how they had taken the observer’s perspective in the rotated-
gaze condition. Of the 84 participants, 81 (96.4%) used at least one of the four strategies. 
Testing (for each strategy separately) the number of participants who adopted the respective 
strategy or not, revealed no significant differences between countries (p > .104; Fisher’s exact 
test, two-sided). Aggregated across the two countries, the majority of participants (56 out of 
84; 66.7%) stated to have turned themselves mentally, 17 (20.2%) stated to have turned 
themselves physically, 15 (17.9%) stated to have turned the questionnaire mentally, and nine 
(10.7%) stated to have turned it physically. Overall, participants preferred mental over 
physical rotation, and a rotation of one’s own perspective over a rotation of the questionnaire. 
Finally, we asked participants for the relative difficulty of the items of the rotated-gaze and 
aligned-gaze condition. The difficulty rating revealed no differences between the two 
countries (χ
2
 = 0.306; N = 84; df = 2; p = .858). Aggregated across the two countries, items of 
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the rotated-gaze condition were more often regarded as more difficult than items of the 
aligned-gaze condition (more difficult: 49; less difficult: 7; χ2 = 31.500; N = 56; df = 1; p < 
.001).  
(3B) Dorsal item sets. Based on previous work (Beller & Bender, 2017), we expected a 
general preference for the ambiguous response option turn-rotation/translation/inward for the 
two countries alike, because this option subsumes responses from participants with a 
preference for translation and from participants with a preference for inward-directed 
reflection. As for the frontal item set, we did not expect a difference between the two gaze 
conditions, but expected that we may find an effect of the control variable order of item sets in 
Block 1. Model selection indeed revealed the one-factor model order of item sets in Block 1 as 
the most parsimonious model showing sufficient fit (G
2
 = 20.018; df = 27; p = .830). Model 
comparisons again indicated a significant main effect of this factor (G
2
 = 32.481; df = 6; 
p < .001), but, as expected, no main effect of country (G2 = 1.822; df = 3; p = .610), and no 
interaction between the two factors (G
2
 = 7.140; df = 6; p = .308). As hypothesized, the factor 
gaze condition together with all of its interactions did not prove to have any significance for 
explaining the data (summed effect: G
2
 = 11.056; df = 18; p = .892). 
In line with the expectations, the majority of participants (76.8%; N2 = 168) preferred the 
ambiguous option consistently across the two dorsal item sets in the two countries alike, 
whereas turn-translation (1.8%) and turn-reflection (7.7%) were only rarely adopted 
consistently (see Table 3[B]). The order effect showed a similar pattern as for the frontal item 
sets. Starting with a frontal item set resulted in a lower proportion of participants with a 
preference for the ambiguous response option and a higher proportion of participants with no 
clear preference (turn-rot/trans/inw: 56.5%; turn-ref: 8.1%; no pref: 30.6%; N2 = 62) as 
compared to starting with a dorsal item set (turn-rot/trans/inw: 86.5%; turn-ref: 9.6%; no 
pref: 3.8%; N2 = 52) or a lateral item set (turn-rot/trans/inw: 90.7%; turn-ref: 5.6%; no pref: 
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3.7%; N2 = 54). The proportion of participants adopting turn-reflection was almost unaffected 
by item order. 
In order to check, on an individual basis, whether or not participants preferred the same 
FoR in each of the two dorsal gaze conditions, we cross-tabulated participants’ preferred FoR 
in the aligned-gaze condition and the rotated-gaze condition, summed over the two countries. 
Of the 84 participants, 62 (73.8%) exhibited the same preference in the two gaze conditions: 
58 participants (69.0%) preferred the option turn-rotation/translation/inward, three (3.6%) 
preferred turn-reflection, and one (1.2%) turn-translation. Six participants (7.1%) changed 
their preferred FoR from one gaze condition to the other, while the remaining 16 participants 
(19.0%) exhibited no preference for any of the three FoRs under scrutiny in at least one of the 
two gaze conditions. A non-significant marginal homogeneity test (std. MH statistic = .624, p 
= .533) provides no reason to assume that participants preferred different FoRs in the two 
gaze conditions. Again, this result also supports the assumption that participants adopted the 
observer’s point of view and described the position of F in relation to G from this perspective.  
The implementation of the two object locations frontal and dorsal as a within-subject 
factor allowed us to relate each participant’s preference in the dorsal item sets to the 
participant’s preference in the frontal item sets and thereby to infer, based on the consistency 
assumption, the strategy that might have generated the dorsal response. To this end, we cross-
tabulated participants’ preferred FoR for frontal and dorsal tasks, summed over the two 
countries. The results are reported in Table 4. Of the 129 preference pairs in which the 
ambiguous response option turn-rotation/translation/inward was chosen on dorsal items, 77 
(59.7%) were indicative of the translation strategy also in the dorsal case (consistent with a 
preference for translation in the frontal case), 42 (32.6%) were indicative of the inward 
strategy (consistent with a preference for reflection in the frontal case), and only one (1.0%) 
was indicative of the turn-rotation strategy (consistent with a preference for rotation in the 
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frontal case). Generally, the turn-strategy—that is, turn the observer towards the objects and 
then adopt the same FoR as on frontal items—was used rarely. Only 13 (7.7%) preference 
pairs were indicative of this strategy (grey cells), and most of these participants adopted turn-
reflection consistent with their frontal preference for reflection.  
 
 
Table 4. Preferred FoR among dorsal items depending on the preferred FoR among 
frontal items. 
 Frontal preference  
Dorsal preference Translation Reflection Rotation No preference Σ 
Turn-translation 0
C
 0 3 0 3 
Turn-reflection 0 12
C







 9 129 
No preference 5 8 0 10 23 
Σ 82 62 4 20 168 
Note. Data are summed over the two gaze conditions and the two countries. Grey cells: Responses in dorsal 
tasks according to the turn-strategy; rot: rotation, trans: translation, inw: inward-directed. 
C
 Preferences that are in line with the consistency assumption. 
 
 
Finally, comparing dorsal and frontal items, we asked participants for the relative 
difficulty of the dorsal and frontal items. The difficulty rating revealed no differences between 
the two countries (χ
2
 = 0.260; N = 84; df = 2; p = .878). Aggregated across the countries, 
dorsal items were more often regarded as more difficult than frontal items (more difficult: 52; 
less difficult: 7; χ2 = 34.322; N = 59; df = 1; p < .001). 
(3C) Lateral item sets. For participants with a preference for translation, nothing should 
change across item sets; they can apply translation on lateral items in the same way as on 
frontal and dorsal items. But what about participants with a preference for reflection? Will 
they follow the consistency assumption and adopt inward-directed reflection even though it is 
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more difficult to construct in lateral settings than in dorsal settings? In that case, we would 
expect an effect of country similar to that from the frontal item sets: a dominance of 
translation over inward-directed reflection in the Norwegian sample and the reverse pattern in 
the German sample (cf. Table 3[A]). As for the other item sets, we expected that we may find 
an effect of the control variable order of item sets in Block 1, but did not expect a difference in 
FoR preference between the two gaze conditions. Yet, model selection revealed the null-logit 
model without any of the three factors as the most parsimonious model showing sufficient fit 
(G
2
 = 46.373; df = 44; p = .375). Different from what we would expect according to the 
consistency assumption, the analysis did not indicate a main effect of country (G2 = 4.455; 
df = 4; p = .348). If at all, the analysis suggested, again, a main effect of order of item sets 
(G
2
 = 24.863; df = 8; p = .002), but no interaction between the two factors (G2 = 6.961; df = 8; 
p = .541). As hypothesized, the factor gaze condition together with all of its interactions did 
not prove to have any significance for explaining the data (summed effect: G
2
 = 10.163; 
df = 24; p = .994). 
As indicated in Table 3(C), the majority of participants (69.6%; N2 = 168) preferred 
translation consistently across the two lateral item sets in the two countries alike, whereas 
turn-translation (1.2%), turn-reflection (10.7%), and the option turn-rotation/inward (2.4%) 
were less often adopted consistently. The order effect produced a similar pattern to that for the 
frontal item sets: Starting with a frontal item set resulted in a lower proportion of participants 
with a preference for translation and a higher proportion with no clear preference (trans: 
50.0%; turn-ref: 17.7%; no pref: 22.6%; N2 = 62) as compared to starting with a dorsal item 
set (trans: 78.8%; turn-ref: 7.7%; no pref: 13.5%; N2 = 52) or a lateral item set (trans: 83.3%; 
turn-ref: 5.6%; no pref: 11.1%; N2 = 54). This time, the proportion of participants adopting 
turn-reflection was also affected by item order. 
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In order to check, on an individual basis, whether or not participants preferred the same 
FoR in each of the two lateral gaze conditions (determined from the observer’s point of view), 
we cross-tabulated participants’ preferred FoR in the aligned-gaze condition and the rotated-
gaze condition, summed over the two countries. Of the 84 participants, 59 (70.2%) exhibited 
the same preference in the two gaze conditions: 52 participants (61.9%) preferred translation, 
six (7.1%) turn-reflection, one (1.2%) the option turn-rotation/inward, and none preferred 
turn-translation. Three participants (3.6%) changed their preferred FoR from one gaze 
condition to the other, while the remaining 22 participants (26.2%) exhibited no preference for 
any of the four FoRs under scrutiny in at least one of the two gaze conditions. A non-
significant marginal homogeneity test (std. MH statistic = .457, p = .648) provides no reason 
to assume that participants preferred different FoRs in the two gaze conditions. This result 
again supports the assumption that participants adopted O’s point of view and described the 
position of F in relation to G from this perspective.  
The implementation of the two object locations frontal and lateral as a within-subject 
factor allowed us to relate each participant’s preference in the lateral item sets to the 
participant’s preference in the frontal item sets and thereby to infer the strategy that might 
have generated the lateral response. To this end, we cross-tabulated participants’ preferred 
FoR for frontal and lateral tasks (summed over the two countries). The results are reported in 
Table 5. They reveal a marked difference between participants preferring translation in frontal 
settings and those preferring reflection. Nearly all participants with a preference for forward 
translation in frontal settings preferred sideward translation in lateral settings (95.1% of the N2 
= 82 preference pairs), in accordance with the consistency assumption. Participants with a 
preference for reflection in frontal settings did not show such a uniform pattern. Only three 
(4.8% of the N2 = 62 preference pairs) were indicative of inward-directed reflection in the 
lateral case. While substantial proportions of participants either adopted the turn-reflection 
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strategy (22.6%) or exhibited no clear preference (27.4%), the majority (43.5%) adopted the 
sideward translation variant, thereby changing their preference, which is at odds with the 
consistency assumption (Figure 5). As for the dorsal data, the turn-strategy was generally 
rarely used. Of the total of 168 preference pairs, only 15 (8.9%) were indicative of this 
strategy (grey cells in Table 5). 
-------------------- Insert Figure 5 here -------------------- 
Finally, we had asked participants for the relative difficulty of the lateral and frontal items. 
Difficulty ratings revealed no differences between the two countries (χ
2
 = 3.067; N = 84; df = 
2; p = .216). Aggregated across the two countries, lateral items were more often regarded as 
more difficult than frontal items (more difficult: 42; less difficult: 7; χ2 = 25.000; N = 49; df = 
1; p < .001). 
 
Table 5. Preferred FoR among lateral items depending on the preferred FoR among 
frontal items. 
 Frontal preference  
Lateral preference Translation Reflection Rotation No preference Σ 
Translation 78
C
 27 2 10 117 
Turn-translation 1
C
 1 0 0 2 
Turn-reflection 0 14
C





 1 4 
No preference 3 17 0 7 27 
Σ 82 62 4 20 168 
Note. Data are summed over the two gaze conditions and the two countries. Grey cells: Responses in lateral 
tasks according to the turn-strategy; rot: rotation, trans: translation, inw: inward-directed. 
C




In this study, we focused on how flexible people are in using the relative FoR in different 
kinds of spatial settings. Specifically, we aimed to assess whether people’s preferences for a 
specific variant of referencing generalize from standard to non-standard situations in line with 
the consistency assumption. If the consistency assumption holds, people with a preference for 
translation in frontal settings should adopt translation also in dorsal and lateral settings, and 
those with a preference for reflection in frontal settings should adopt inward-directed 
reflection also in dorsal and lateral settings. Alternatively, people might switch from a 
preference for reflection in frontal settings to other strategies in lateral settings because 
consistency is more difficult to preserve for reflection (than for translation) as it requires an 
additional rotation of the left-right axis. To test these hypotheses, we assessed FoR 
preferences in frontal, dorsal, and lateral settings, and we compared two perspectives (aligned 
vs. rotated gaze). 
Overall, the results indicated that participants adopted the requested perspective without 
noticeable impairment to cognitive processing; had strong preferences for a particular FoR 
within item sets; and exhibited similar FoR preferences in frontal and dorsal situations as in 
previous studies, but changed these preferences at least partly in lateral situations. In the 
following, we give a brief summary of each of these findings, before discussing open 
questions arising from them.  
The participants did take the perspective of the depicted observer (with aligned or rotated 
gaze) as required by the instruction. Subjectively, many participants regarded items with 
rotated gaze as more difficult compared to items with aligned gaze, but this difference was not 
reflected in the time on task, the number of unexplained responses, the consistency of FoR 
adoption, or the FoR preference within different item sets (generally, we observed fairly low 
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rates of unexplained responses, indicating that the FoRs considered here were sufficient to 
cover most responses). The large majority of our participants chose to turn themselves 
(physically or mentally) rather than the questionnaire to take the rotated perspective, and the 
ease with which they engaged in referencing from this perspective is in line with research 
revealing that people perceive viewer rotation to be easier than array rotation (Lambrey, 
Doeller, Berthoz, & Burgess, 2012; Wang & Simons, 1999). 
Participants responded highly consistently within item sets by adopting their preferred 
FoR on most items of the respective set, suggesting that many participants decided on the first 
item of a set which FoR to adopt and then applied this FoR to the whole set of similar items 
(cf. Beller et al., 2016).  
Regarding FoR preferences, our frontal data replicated previous findings (Beller & 
Bender, 2017) insofar as most participants adopted either translation or reflection, with a 
higher rate of translation in the Norwegian than the German sample. in the Norwegian sample, 
however, the overall preference flipped from a majority preferring reflection in our 2017 
study, to a majority preferring translation in the current study; and the overall preference for 
reflection in the German sample was less pronounced in the current study than it was in all of 
our previous studies (Beller et al., 2015, 2016; Beller & Bender, 2017). These differences in 
preferences may be due to accidental variation or due to the specific mindset participants 
happened to have prior to the experiment (e.g., having moved to the lab is likely to prime 
translation), and are in line with the general observation that people flexibly switch FoRs 
depending on demand characteristics of task and situation. 
As expected, the dorsal data replicated the high rate of participants who chose the 
ambiguous turn-rotation/translation/inward option in the two countries. In line with the 
consistency assumption, this might reflect a preference for backward translation and for 
inward-directed reflection when applied to dorsal items. In contrast, the lateral data supported 
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the consistency assumption only partially, namely (a) for those participants with a preference 
for translation in frontal settings who were found to adopt turn-translation and sideward 
translation in the lateral settings, and (b) for those participants with a preference for (inward-
directed) reflection in frontal settings who were found to adopt turn-reflection or inward-
directed reflection in the lateral settings. However, most participants with a preference for 
(inward-directed) reflection in frontal settings adopted sideward translation in lateral settings, 
which is at odds with the consistency assumption. 
Taken together, these findings leave us with at least three questions to be discussed in the 
remainder of this section: What can be inferred from the lateral results for the consistency 
assumption? Why do so many people switch from frontal reflection to lateral translation? And 
what does this reveal about referencing more generally? For a discussion of possible reasons 
for the order effects, see Appendix C. 
The lateral results and the consistency assumption 
The consistency assumption is one answer to the theoretical question of whether people 
transfer preferences for a specific variant of referencing from standard to non-standard 
situations. It was introduced in order to infer from an ambiguous overt response option in 
dorsal tasks which covert strategy participants might have used to solve these tasks: the 
translation strategy, the inward-directed strategy, or the turn-rotation strategy (Beller et al., 
2015, 2016). We argued that people would prefer a strategy that is at least consistent with (or 
derived from) how they construct the relative FoR in frontal situations; and on the basis of 
participants’ preference for translation and (inward-directed) reflection in frontal tasks, we 
inferred translation and inward-directed reflection to be the most likely strategies for making 
dorsal references. But data from dorsal tasks remain empirically inconclusive. We therefore 
designed lateral tasks so as to allow us to disentangle translation from the other two strategies. 
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While the empirical results are straightforward, they only partly support the consistency 
assumption: Nearly all participants with a preference for translation in frontal tasks 
consistently used translation also in lateral tasks. Participants with a preference for (inward-
directed) reflection, however, did not respond in such a homogeneous way. While a few of 
them indeed adopted inward-directed reflection in lateral tasks, and some adopted turn-
reflection (both in line with the consistency assumption), most switched to translation in the 
lateral tasks—contrary to the consistency assumption.  
As described in the introduction, applying inward-directed reflection to a lateral task is 
different from applying this FoR to a dorsal task. Whereas the two cases are identical in that 
the front-back axis is chosen so as to point towards the observer, which implicates relatively 
few cognitive costs, the two cases differ in how the left-right axis is construed: by a direct 
mapping from O’s left-right in a dorsal task (see Figure 2B), yet by a cognitively more 
demanding rotation of the left-right axis in a lateral task (Figure 2D). The assumption that 
participants may simply have tried to avoid this rotation is supported by the observation that 
most of them did not adopt the rotation variant of the relative FoR in frontal tasks (cf. Table 
3[A]), and that they evaluated tasks involving rotation of the perspective as more difficult 
(despite the ease with which they adopted the rotated observer’s perspective). 
Sideward translation as an eye-catching alternative 
In a lateral task, the ground object G is located at one side of the observer O. This 
arrangement suggests dividing the space around O along the left-right axis into two areas: a 
“frontal” area extending from this axis in the gaze direction of O, and a “dorsal” area 
extending from this axis in the opposite direction, as illustrated in Figure 4. Having defined 
space in this way, sideward translation of the FoR originally anchored in O along the left-right 
axis O–G suggests itself as an easy operation. 
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---------------------------------- Insert Figure 4 about here ---------------------------------- 
The availability of this alternative strategy may explain the high proportion of sideward 
translation among participants with a preference for reflection in frontal settings.  
Implications of the flexibility in FoR use  
Research on spatial referencing has demonstrated that the relative FoR is used with a 
substantial amount of variation: variation with regard to whether a relative FoR is adopted at 
all and, if so, whether it is preferred over the other FoRs; variation with regard to how the 
relative FoR is constructed (i.e., by translation, reflection, or rotation); and variation with 
regard to whether the principles for constructing a relative FoR are preserved when moving 
from standard to non-standard referencing situations. Apparently, people do not apply their 
preferred variant of the relative FoR to all kinds of situations, but rather flexibly adapt their 
strategy when doing so is more convenient.  
Importantly, much of this variation occurs not only across populations (languages and 
cultures), but also within populations, and not only between individuals, but also within 
individuals. If one assumes that referencing is an inherently communicative activity, both a 
preference for the relative FoR and the flexibility in using it must be puzzling. Other than the 
binary FoRs, different variants of the relative FoR produce different accounts of spatial 
relations. Not knowing on which principles a speaker’s FoR is based renders it a priori 
impossible for the hearer to know whether the ball is “in front of” or “behind” the box (Wu & 
Keysar, 2007). To avoid misunderstandings, additional explanations and deictic gestures seem 
to be indispensable. In so doing, however, they render the referencing expression redundant, 
which raises the possibility that one key purpose of such expressions might be encoding for 
representation and memorization rather than communication. 
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The degree of flexibility in choosing a relative FoR in space also has implications for 
other domains. As stated in the introduction, some theories claim that referencing preferences 
are generalized from space to more abstract domains. For instance, representations of time or 
number are supposed to unfold along similar axes, in line with cultural conventions for spatial 
representations (e.g., Boroditsky & Gaby, 2010; Shaki, Fischer, & Petrusic, 2009). In light of 
how flexible people actually are in adopting their FoRs depending on task and context 
(including the construction of specific variants of this FoR according to diverging principles), 
generalizations to other domains should be take with more caution (cf., Bender & Beller, 
2014; Bender, Rothe-Wulf, & Beller, 2018). 
Conclusion 
The current study scrutinised the consistency assumption, according to which people in 
non-standard, dorsal and lateral referencing situations adopt a strategy that is consistent with 
(or derived from) how they construct the relative FoR in standard, frontal situations. We found 
the assumption to be violated for those participants with a preference for reflection in frontal 
settings, who prevalently switched to translation in lateral settings. This implies that these 
participants adopted a FoR based on a different construction principle in non-standard 
situations. The finding demonstrates within-subject variation with regard to which variant of 
the relative FoR people adopt in static, small-scale referencing tasks, most likely due to 
specific affordances of the lateral tasks that invite sideward translation. Generally, people with 
a preference for reflection in frontal situations need to be more flexible in FoR construction, 
since the reflection principle does not neatly apply to non-standard, dorsal and lateral 
situations, whereas the translation principle can always be applied in the same way, 
independently of where the objects are located around a person. For two reasons, however, the 
consistency assumption does not need to be abandoned completely. First, the violation of the 
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assumption in lateral settings does not necessarily generalize to dorsal settings; after all, 
constructing the consistent inward-directed FoR is less difficult in dorsal than lateral settings. 
And second, even in lateral tasks, the majority of participants responded in line with the 
consistency assumption, namely all those with a preference for translation in frontal tasks, 
who adopted turn-translation and sideward translation, and those with a preference for 
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Figure 1. (A) FoRs for binary relations: (i) the direct FoR (Danziger, 2010) as a specific case 
of (ii) the intrinsic FoR. (B) Three variants of the relative FoR for ternary relations (Levinson, 
2003; adapted from Beller et al., 2015, Figure 2). FRONT in a coordinate system is indicated by 
the tip of the arrow; F = figure object, G = ground object, O = observer’s viewpoint, L/R = 
left/right. 
Figure 2. Variants of the relative FoR for dorsal settings (A and B) and lateral settings (C and 
D). FRONT in a coordinate system is indicated by the tip of the arrow; F = figure object, G = 
ground object, O = observer’s viewpoint, L/R = left/right. 
Figure 3. Example items from each of the six item sets. 
Figure 4. Dividing the space along the left-right axis O–G defines a frontal area and a dorsal 
area and suggests a sideward translation of the observer’s direct FoR. 
Figure 5. FoR selection in lateral settings among participants with a frontal preference for 
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In the following, the spatial configurations of all items are displayed. In each case, the task required participants to take the perspective of a depicted 
observer and to describe (from this perspective) how the white circle is related to the black square by marking one of eight response options. 
 
 
(A) Gaze of observer in relation to Ego: aligned 
Frontal items 
f_00_1 f_00_2 f_00_3 f_00_4 
l_00_1 l_00_2 l_00_3 l_00_4 l_00_5 l_00_6 
Lateral items 
Dorsal items 
d_00_1 d_00_2 d_00_3 d_00_4 
Response format 
The white circle is located … 
□ in front of  □ in front and to the left of 
□ behind □ in front and to the right of 
□ to the left of □ behind and to the left of 
□ to the right of □ behind and to the right of 










The white circle is located … 
□ in front of  □ in front and to the left of 
□ behind □ in front and to the right of 
□ to the left of □ behind and to the left of 
□ to the right of □ behind and to the right of 
… the square. f_90_1 f_90_2 f_90_3 f_90_4 
l_90_3 l_90_1 l_90_2 l_90_4 l_90_5 l_90_6 




In order to analyse the distribution of participants’ FoR preferences, we performed three 
log-linear analyses (Kennedy, 1992), one each for the frontal, the dorsal, and the lateral data. 
The analyses included the two main factors of interest, country (Norway vs. Germany) and 
gaze condition (aligned vs. rotated), and the control factor order of item sets in Block 1 
(frontal first vs. dorsal first vs. lateral first) that proved to be significant in the analyses of the 
unexplained responses and the consistency values described in the main text. Gaze condition 
is considered as between-subjects factor; therefore, the total N of the analyses (168) equals 
twice the total number of participants (84). 
Model selection strategy: Model selection generally aims at identifying the most 
parsimonious combination of factors that is sufficient to explain the data without losing the fit 
between model and data. In our case, model fit was determined based on the G
2
 statistics, with 
p ≥ .100 indicating sufficient fit. We started model selection with the saturated model. This 
model includes all factors and their interactions, and therefore, by definition, explains the data 
with a perfect fit (G
2
 = 0; df = 0; p = 1). More parsimonious models were then selected in the 
following, hypothesis-driven manner. First, we excluded the factor gaze condition (and all its 
interactions with the other factors) based on the hypothesis that participants do take the 
perspective of the depicted observer (aligned vs. rotated) and adopt the same FoR from each 
of the two perspectives. In each of the three analyses, the resulting interaction model country 
× order of item sets in Block 1 had sufficient fit (p ≥ .892), indicating that the factor gaze 
condition was not necessary to explain the data. Next, we excluded the interaction country × 
order of item sets in Block 1 based on the fact that such an interaction was not significant in 
the analyses of the unexplained responses and the consistency values. In each of the three 
analyses, the resulting model with two main effects, country and order of item sets in Block 1, 
had sufficient fit (p ≥ .793). Then, we tested whether or not the main effects of country and 
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order of item sets in Block 1 could be excluded from the model in order to check whether or 
not any of these factors are necessary to explain the data. We hypothesized a main effect of 
country not for the dorsal item set, but for the frontal set based on the results of a previous 
study (Beller & Bender, 2017) and also for the lateral set based on the consistency 
assumption. A main effect of order of item sets in Block 1 was suggested by the analyses of 
the unexplained responses and the consistency values. If the exclusion of one of these factors 
resulted in a loss of fit between model and data, the corresponding factor remained in the 
model, otherwise not. If none of the factors under scrutiny were necessary, then model 





Included as a control variable, the order of item sets in Block 1 had consistent and 
systematic effects on participants’ references in all three types of analyses: for unexplained 
responses, consistency values, and FoR preferences. Participants starting the questionnaire 
with a frontal item set had higher proportions of unexplained responses, lower consistency 
values, and more often no clear FoR preference across all item sets. Some possible reasons 
can be inferred by inspecting the data from the questionnaire’s first block of items (see Table 
C1; and for similar patterns in the second block of items, Table C2). 
One reason could be that this subsample of participants happened—by coincidence—to 
give more heterogeneous responses in general. Some support for this assumption can be found 
by inspecting the very first item set participants had worked on, which represents responses 
unaffected by order effects. In their first item set, participants who started with a frontal set 
already exhibited a higher proportion of unexplained responses (13.7%), lower consistency 
values (82.3%), and more often no clear FoR preference (25.8%) as compared to those 
participants who started the questionnaire with a dorsal item set (unexplained: 7.7%; 
consistency: 90.4%; no pref: 7.7%) or a lateral item set (unexplained: 4.9%; consistency: 
84.6%; no pref: 11.1%) as indicated in Table C1, first sets. 
Another reason could be that participants starting with a standard (frontal) referencing 
situation and the reflection strategy are required to adapt their strategy to the subsequent non-
standard (dorsal and lateral) situations—and might struggle with this adaptation. This 
assumption is reflected in two observations: First, participants who started with the frontal 
item set exhibited a relatively high preference for reflection (41.9%) as compared to 
translation (25.8%) in their frontal item set. And second, the proportion of unexplained 
responses increased from the first, frontal set to the second, lateral set (first set: 13.7%; second 
set: 22.0%), while this was not the case for participants who started with the dorsal item set 
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(first, dorsal set: 7.7%; second, frontal set: 3.8%) or for participants who started with the 
lateral item set (first, lateral set: 4.9%; second, dorsal set: 0.0%; see Table C1).  
 
 
Table C1. Unexplained responses, individual consistency, and preferred FoR in the different 
item sets (frontal, lateral, and dorsal) of the first block of items, depending on the order of the 
item sets in this block. The data are aggregated over the two gaze conditions (aligned and 
rotated) and the two countries (Norway and Germany). 
 Order of item sets in Block 1 
 Frontal, lateral, 
dorsal (N = 31) 
Lateral, dorsal, 
frontal (N = 27) 
Dorsal, frontal, 
lateral (N = 26) 
Frontal item sets Set 1 Set 3 Set 2 
Unexplained responses (%) 13.7   3.7   3.8 
Individual consistency (%) 82.3 95.4 90.4 
Preferred FoR (% [N])    
Translation 25.8   (8) 63.0 (17) 61.5 (16) 
Reflection 41.9 (13) 33.3   (9) 34.6   (9) 
Rotation   6.5   (2)   0.0   (0)   0.0   (0) 
No preference 25.8   (8)   3.7   (1)   3.8   (1) 
Lateral item sets Set 2 Set 1 Set 3 
Unexplained responses (%) 22.0   4.9 10.3 
Individual consistency (%) 67.7 84.6 84.0 
Preferred FoR (% [N])    
Translation 45.2 (14) 85.2 (23) 76.9 (20) 
Turn-translation   0.0   (0)   0.0   (0)   0.0   (0) 
Turn-reflection 12.9   (4)   3.7   (1)   3.8   (1) 
Turn-rotation/inward   9.7   (3)   0.0   (0)   0.0   (0) 
No preference 32.3 (10) 11.1   (3) 19.2   (5) 
Dorsal item sets Set 3 Set 2 Set 1 
Unexplained responses (%) 21.0   0.0   7.7 
Individual consistency (%) 75.8 95.4 90.4 
Preferred FoR (% [N])    
Turn-translation   6.5   (2)   0.0   (0)   0.0   (0) 
Turn-reflection   9.7   (3)   3.7   (1)   3.8   (1) 
Turn-rotation/translation/inward 51.6 (16) 92.6 (25) 88.5 (23) 





By contrast, participants starting with a non-standard, dorsal situation may have had more 
difficulties in producing a reference strategy in the first place, but fewer difficulties in keeping 
it. Whatever strategy they came up with in their first item set could simply have been re-used 
for a subsequent frontal item set (Beller et al., 2016). The pre-activated dorsal FoR typically 
has the orientation of a translational FoR—irrespective of the mental strategy that led to this 
FoR—leading to an increase of translation in subsequent frontal situations. There is also some 
support for such a priming effect. While the group of participants starting with a frontal item 
set exhibited a clear preference for reflection over translation in frontal tasks (refl: 41.9%; 
trans: 25.8%), the reverse holds for the group starting with a dorsal item set (refl: 34.6%; 
trans: 61.5%) and for the group starting with a lateral item set (refl: 33.3%; trans: 63.0%): a 
preference for translation over reflection for a frontal item set subsequent to a dorsal item set 
(see Table C1). Such a priming effect can also explain the generally high preference for 
translation in frontal situations: The majority of participants had worked on dorsal items prior 
to the frontal ones (priming possible), whereas only a minority started directly with the frontal 














Table C2. Unexplained responses, individual consistency, and preferred FoR in the different 
item sets (frontal, lateral, and dorsal) of the second block of items, depending on the order of 
the item sets in the first block. Please note that the frontal, lateral, and dorsal sets do not 
correspond to the fourth, fifth, and sixth item set of the questionnaire due to the grouping of the 
data according to the order in Block 1 (a different grouping is shown in Table C3). The data are 
aggregated over the two gaze conditions (aligned and rotated) and the two countries (Norway 
and Germany). 
 Order of item sets in Block 1 
 Frontal, lateral, 
dorsal (N = 31) 
Lateral, dorsal, 
frontal (N = 27) 
Dorsal, frontal, 
lateral (N = 26) 
Frontal item sets    
Unexplained responses (%)  12.9   1.9   2.9 
Individual consistency (%) 82.3 95.4 94.2 
Preferred FoR (% [N])    
Translation 35.5 (11) 55.6 (15) 57.7 (15) 
Reflection 32.3 (10) 40.7 (11) 38.5 (10) 
Rotation   6.5   (2)   0.0   (0)   0.0   (0) 
No preference 25.8   (8)   3.7   (1)   3.8   (1) 
Lateral item sets    
Unexplained responses (%) 11.8   4.9   7.7 
Individual consistency (%) 79.0 84.6 86.5 
Preferred FoR (% [N])    
Translation 54.8 (17) 81.5 (22) 80.8 (21) 
Turn-translation   6.5   (2)   0.0   (0)   0.0   (0) 
Turn-reflection 22.6   (7)   7.4   (2) 11.5   (3) 
Turn-rotation/inward   3.2   (1)   0.0   (0)   0.0   (0) 
No preference 12.9   (4) 11.1   (3)   7.7   (2) 
Dorsal item sets    
Unexplained responses (%) 21.0   2.8   1.0 
Individual consistency (%) 76.6 95.4 97.1 
Preferred FoR (% [N])    
Turn-translation   3.2   (1)   0.0   (0)   0.0   (0) 
Turn-reflection   6.5   (2)   7.4   (2) 15.4   (4) 
Turn-rotation/translation/inward 61.3 (19) 88.9 (24) 84.6 (22) 







Table C3. Unexplained responses, individual consistency, and preferred FoR in the different 
item sets (frontal, lateral, and dorsal) of the second block of items, depending on the order of 
the item sets in this block. Different from Table C2, the frontal, lateral, and dorsal sets 
correspond to the fourth, fifth, and sixth set of the questionnaire as indicated in the table. The 
data are aggregated over the two gaze conditions (aligned and rotated) and the two countries 
(Norway and Germany). 
 Order of item sets in Block 2 
 Frontal, lateral, 
dorsal (N = 25) 
Lateral, dorsal, 
frontal (N = 29) 
Dorsal, frontal, 
lateral (N = 30) 
Frontal item sets Set 4 Set 6 Set 5 
Unexplained responses (%)   5.0   5.2   8.3 
Individual consistency (%) 92.0 90.5 88.3 
Preferred FoR (% [N])    
Translation 40.0 (10) 51.7 (15) 53.3 (16) 
Reflection 48.0 (12) 37.9 (11) 26.7   (8) 
Rotation   4.0   (1)   0.0   (0)   3.3   (1) 
No preference   8.0   (2) 10.3   (3) 16.7   (5) 
Lateral item sets Set 5 Set 4 Set 6 
Unexplained responses (%) 11.3   6.3 7.8 
Individual consistency (%) 78.0 85.1 85.6 
Preferred FoR (% [N])    
Translation 60.0 (15) 79.3 (23) 73.3 (22) 
Turn-translation   0.0   (0)   3.4   (1)   3.3   (1) 
Turn-reflection 24.0   (6)   6.9   (2) 13.3   (4) 
Turn-rotation/inward   4.0   (1)   0.0   (0)   0.0   (0) 
No preference 12.0   (3) 10.3   (3) 10.0   (3) 
Dorsal item sets Set 6 Set 5 Set 4 
Unexplained responses (%) 12.0   3.4 11.7 
Individual consistency (%) 85.0 94.8 86.7 
Preferred FoR (% [N])    
Turn-translation   4.0   (1)   0.0   (0)   0.0   (0) 
Turn-reflection 16.0   (4) 10.3   (3)   3.3   (1) 
Turn-rotation/translation/inward 64.0 (16) 86.2 (25) 80.0 (24) 
No preference 16.0   (4)    3.4   (1) 16.7   (5) 
 
